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Abstract
The central thesis of this paper is that what underlies contemporary popular films with 
convoluted plots and highly complex spatio-temporal structure is neoliberal subjectivity. Particularly 
in Hollywood films, the omnipotence of the individual and the spreading of multiple identities 
together reveal the fundamental ambivalence of such subjectivity. Although a number of films should 
be discussed to explore fully the cinematic articulation of neoliberal subjectivity and its multifaceted 
quality, the primary object of analysis in this paper is the film Source Code (Duncan Jones, 2011). The 
puzzle like quality of this film owes much to its articulation of ambiguous relationships between the 
present and the past, reality and simulation, this world and alternate worlds, all making the audiences 
extremely confused and spatio-temporally disoriented. Source Code therefore belongs to a new critical 
genre variously called “puzzle films,” “irreality films,” “mind-game films,” “complex films,” and 
“atemporal cinema.” These categories greatly overlap each other, yet do not necessarily refer to the 
identical group of films or signify the same idea. The paper first attempts to clarify what theoretical 
assumptions underlie each of these notions, and reexamine them as a symptomatic manifestation of 
cinematic neoliberal subjectivity. In the rest of the paper, the fundamental ambivalence of Source Code 
is scrutinized. On one hand, Source Code can be interpreted as a utopian film presenting, contrary to 
the central tenet of neoliberal rationality, a possibility of imagining alternative or another world. On 
the other hand, the complexity of the film heavily draws on the constitutive features of the neoliberal 
system, according to which there is absolutely no alternative. Source Code therefore deserves a close 
critical scrutiny not because it offers a utopian alternative to neoliberalism but because it helps us 
cognitively map the neoliberal present. 
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This paper argues that what underlies contemporary popular films with convoluted plots and 
highly complex spatio-temporal structure is neoliberal subjectivity. Particularly in Hollywood 
films, the omnipotence of the individual and the spreading of multiple identities together reveal 
the fundamental ambivalence of such subjectivity. Although a number of films should be discussed 
to explore fully the cinematic articulation of neoliberal subjectivity and its multifaceted quality, 
the primary object of analysis in this paper is the film Source Code (Duncan Jones, 2011), which 
“has become,” in Garrett Stewart’s words, “a minor litmus test in current writing about the 
posthuman in cinema—not because it is better than other films in this cyborgian vein, or because it 
offers their compendium, but rather because, in stretching out of shape its time-travel premise by 
a detective trajectory, then bending it back recursively on itself, it takes any such conjoined logic 
both to an extreme and to pieces at once.”1 A science fiction movie with complex narrative, Source 
Code features the hero Colter Stevens—played by the actor Jake Gyllenhaal—who is repeatedly 
sent back to an about-to-be-bombed commuter train during the exact same eight minute period in 
the past in order to discover enough clues to prevent another—and far more devastating—terrorist 
attack on the city of Chicago. The puzzle like quality of the film owes much to its articulation of 
ambiguous relationships between the present and the past, reality and simulation, this world and 
alternate worlds, all making the audiences extremely confused and spatio-temporally disoriented. 
Source Code therefore belongs to a new critical genre variously called “puzzle films,” “irreality 
films,” “mind-game films,” “complex films,” and “atemporal cinema.” They greatly overlap each 
other, yet do not necessarily refer to the identical group of films or signify the same idea. 
Puzzle films are, according to Warren Buckland, identified by such characteristics as 
narrative complexity and intricacy, fragmentary presentation of episodes, ambiguous boundaries 
separating reality and dream, multi-leveled reality, gaps in narration, non-transparency of 
narrative logic and structure, difficulty to disentangle complicated narrative threads.2 Constructed 
like complex puzzles, these films defy conventional expectations and categorizations (e.g., a 
distinction between popular movies and art films is virtually meaningless vis-à-vis the notion of 
puzzle films), and stimulate the viewers’ curiosity and desire in new ways. A main problem with 
the discourse on puzzle films is that the characteristics just mentioned are posited as the attributes 
of the non-classical narrative; that is, they are perceived in terms of their difference or deviance 
from the classical norm. To this extent, the notion of puzzle films tends to domesticate the 
significance of new forms and the historical changes underlying those forms. Although it is quite 
useful to highlight and critically analyze many contemporary films, the notion of puzzle films 
needs to be employed cautiously in order not to get bogged down in empty debates on what makes 
films “classical” or “non-classical.” 
Todd McGowan’s idea of “atemporal cinema” also refers to types of films whose complex 
narrative—regarded as a product of digitalization—seriously challenges the viewers’ cognitive 
ability. Atemporal cinema is defined by its temporal complexity, or more specifically, distortion of 
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chronological time. Distorted time in atemporal films does not move forward in a linear fashion. 
McGowan stresses that the non-linear temporality of atemporal cinema has basically nothing to 
do with the represented content of a film. “The atemporal cinematic mode,” writes McGowan, 
“does not distort forward-moving time simply because of the demands of story, as is the case with 
science fiction. Its distortions are instead formal ones.”3 The viewers of atemporal cinema actually 
experience a temporal complexity, distortion, or confusion rather than  watch the representations 
of distorted time in the story which is conventionally narrated in observance of chronological 
temporality. But McGowan’s insistence on the absolute necessity to distinguish between form 
and content is, as he himself implicitly acknowledges, arbitrary and untenable in the end because 
the recurrent motifs of time travel, branching time, and alternate histories in science fiction films 
can never be reduced to the thematic content of the story. Since the 1990s, they have engendered 
highly complex modes of film narration and temporality at a formal level. As is clear from his 
following remark, McGowan tries to preserve the conceptual integrity of atemporal cinema by 
acknowledging the existence of ambivalent films: “[David] Lynch’s films both belong and don’t 
belong to the atemporal cinematic mode because the atemporal discourse is the result of the 
exigencies of specific stories that involve the distortion of time.” 4 Lynch’s films are, however, 
hardly an exception. Furthermore, the complexity of contemporary films cannot be reduced to the 
question of time. For these reasons, the notion of atemporal cinema has limited critical efficacy for 
the purpose of elucidating a connection between cinema and neoliberal subjectivity. 
Irreality films, a category used by Sean Cubitt, include such films as Déjà Vu (Tony Scott, 
2005), Next (Lee Tamahori, 2007), Wanted (Timor Bekmambetov, 2008), Knowing (Alex Proyas, 
2009), Inception (Christopher Nolan, 2010), The Adjustment Bureau (George Nolfi, 2011), and 
Source Code. What is commonly found in these films is, according to Cubbitt, the basic idea that 
“the world is itself a data construct or can be treated as such.”5 In The Matrix (Andy and Lana 
Wachowski, 1999) and other similar films which problematize the status of reality, characters 
are originally “immersed in a virtual reality,” but eventually awaken to the fact that reality exists 
somewhere else. While reality and virtual reality are clearly distinguished in these films, irreality 
films present stories in which what is at stake is not the difference between reality and virtual 
reality. For in irreality films, “it is reality itself that is unreal.”6 Conceptually, the idea of irreality 
films is quite clear and not marred by any logical inconsistency or critical shortcomings. But it 
does not say too much about the questions of narrative ambiguity and spatio-temporal complexity 
of contemporary cinema.  
Another frequently used concept, the mind-game film, is proposed by Thomas Elsaesser.7 
Mind-game films play games with both characters and audiences. Characters are put in a situation 
where they are played games with but have access to little information on who is playing the game 
based on what rules for what purpose. Mind-game films also often feature pathological or mentally 
unstable characters as protagonists, who are uncertain of their identities, experiences, and worlds. 
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These films “‘play games’ with the audience’s (and the characters’) perception of reality: they 
oblige one to choose between seemingly equally valid, but ultimately incompatible ‘realities’ or 
‘multiverses’....”8 Deceptions, misleading information, and audio-visual ambiguities abound, but 
the audiences frequently cannot see through many of these disorienting elements as they appear 
on the screen. Mind-game films refuse to offer a secure cognitive position for spectators, yet it is 
precisely because of this lack of a privileged perspectival position that the audiences are drawn 
into a film’s mind game as its active participants. Elsaesser argues that in mind-game films, 
the most intriguing and innovative feature is this insistence on temporality 
as a separate dimension of consciousness and identity, the play on nonlinear 
sequence or inverted causality, on chance and contingency, on synchronicity 
and simultaneity and their effects on characters, agency, and human relations: 
we are in worlds that often look just like ours, but where multiple time-lines 
coexist, where the narrative engenders its own loops or Möbius strips, where 
there may well be a beginning, a middle, and an end, but they certainly are not 
presented in that order, and thus the spectator’s own meaning-making activity 
involves constant retroactive revision, new reality-checks, displacements, and 
reorganization not only of temporal sequence, but of mental space, and the 
presumption of a possible switch in cause and effect.9
All these features certainly constitute intricate puzzles at a certain level of spectators’ engagement 
with mind-game films. If Elsaesser nonetheless avoids using the term “puzzle film,” it is probably 
because the puzzle film as a concept is too static, and as such fails to foreground a dynamic 
process in which film works on audiences, and audiences on films. More importantly, the idea of 
puzzle has been closely associated with narratological approaches centered around the notion of 
classical narrative; that is, these approaches tend to reduce everything to the question of narrative 
structure, leading to a futile debate on whether puzzle films do not fundamentally change or 
introduce some minor variations into the so-called classical narrative system or paradigm. By 
selectively focusing on a partial aspect of contemporary films, the narratological intervention may 
be able to show that it is “business as usual.” It yields, however, a highly skewed and banal view 
on contemporary cinema.
In the rest of this paper, instead of settling on one notion as the definitive concept and 
consistently employing it to the exclusion of all others, I will use such terms as  mind-game films, 
puzzle films, irreality films, and complex films relatively freely and often interchangeably. For 
each term has its own merits and demerits, so that depending on what is specifically examined, 
which term is most appropriate or productive for analysis would change. But the lack of one 
standardized term should not be interpreted as a sign of scholarly deficiency; that is, it is not 
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because there is not enough accumulation of scholarship on and critical insights into puzzle films 
that partially overlapping categories coexist. As Elsaesser argues, the films we are interested in 
analyzing do not constitute a genre or a sub-genre. They should be regarded instead as a certain 
tendency or more broadly as a phenomenon,10 the significance of which goes beyond the domain 
of film. The difficulty of agreeing on one concept to refer to an increasingly conspicuous cultural 
phenomenon does not signify a failure of scholarship. On the contrary, this difficulty itself is part 
of the phenomenon. 
In his discussions on mind-game films, Elsaesser points out that the viewers are “confronted 
with odd objects or puzzling details that do not ‘add up’ —even though the overall experience 
‘makes sense’.”11 The coexistence of these two features are extremely important. Complex films 
are obviously very complex, and give the audiences disorienting experiences. Yet the narratives 
of these films are not simply convoluted and undecidable; that is, depending on how we watch 
them, they often appear quite conventional and even banal. Source Code, for instance, apparently 
has an easy-to-predict happy ending with the formation of a heterosexual couple consisting of the 
hero and the woman whose life he finally succeeds in saving. Déjà Vu, another “litmus test” film 
in critical discussions on complex puzzle like films, also follows a virtually identical narrative 
pattern. The film’s protagonist is ATF’s special agent Doug Carlin (Denzel Washington), who 
investigates a terrorist bombing of a ferry in New Orleans carrying US Navy sailors and their 
families. During the investigation, the body of a young woman washes up on the shores of the 
Mississippi. She is initially regarded as one of the bombing victims by the authorities, but Doug 
quickly realizes that this woman, Claire Kuchever (Paula Patton), is not killed by a bomb, and 
somehow thinks that her murder holds the key to solve the case of terrorist bombing. When he 
joins a secret group of government investigators, Doug is introduced to the high-tech surveillance 
apparatus called “Snow White.” Drawing on the power of seven GPS satellites, Snow White works 
as a time shifting magic mirror, which enables Doug and others to go back in time to the world of 
four days and six hours ago, and observe any events or actions as they unfold in real time. It turns 
out, however, that what is supposed to be a passive surveillance apparatus is actually a time travel 
machine. The large screen in the secret operation room does not show the images of the “recorded” 
past; the present and the past are connected to each other in real time by the screen functioning as 
an interface. This retroactive revelation of the true nature of Snow White fundamentally changes 
the nature of Doug Carlin’s mission. Like Source Code’s Colter Stevens, Doug tries to rescue a 
woman who was brutally murdered rather than simply investigate an already happened crime to 
find its culprit. And as in Source Code, he “succeeds” in saving her. While another time loop film 
Edge of Tomorrow (Doug Liman, 2014) likewise suggests that the main character William Cage 
(Tom Cruise) does get a girl (Emily Blunt) in the end, Oblivion (Joseph Kosinski, 2013), a science 
fiction film whose narrative is structured around the motif of human cloning, ends with a hopeful 
scene where the husband (Tom Cruise) and the wife (Olga Kurylenko) are reunited. Despite the 
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multiple layers of ambiguities embedded in the puzzle-like narrative, each of these films is a 
cognitively challenging yet quite intelligible work of entertainment. The lack of precise answers 
to narrative enigmas or the lapse in narrative logic do not automatically prevent the audiences 
from enjoying the complex film as a narrative spectacle. This is why, as Elsaesser points out, some 
prominent scholars of film narration and storytelling “tend to perceive mind-game films either as 
occasions for refining existing classifications or as challenges to prove that there is nothing new 
under the sun when it comes to storytelling.”12 
Our mind is certainly stimulated by the puzzle-like structure of a film. At the same time, we 
are not completely disoriented because the narrative complexity is compensated by what appears to 
be the conventional happy ending in which a heterosexual couple is formed. But this observation 
needs to be further scrutinized. When these films are examined more closely, it becomes less 
certain if the ending can be simply dismissed as too old-fashioned or convenient for the plot. Do 
they really conclude with a happy ending? Do they even have a narrative resolution in the most 
conventional sense? Although many recent Hollywood movies may seem to present the same old 
formula, the ending—and therefore the entire narrative—is conventional in appearance only. The 
hero often overcomes what appears to be an insurmountable obstacle, i.e., his own death. But 
does this constitute a happy ending? Even if it does, for whom is it a happy ending? In Déjà Vu, 
Doug travels to the past, the day the ferry was bombed by a sociopathic—home-grown—terrorist, 
and successfully saves Claire. Meanwhile, he himself is trapped inside a pickup truck under 
water, and loses his life. Although her ordeal has just ended, Claire gets all shook up, sobbing 
in the midst of a chaotic situation on the ground. Then, a man approaches her to ask questions 
about the thwarted terror attack. To her surprise,  the man talking to her is none other than Doug 
Carlin. This is of course not the Doug who has travelled from the future and just drowned in the 
Mississippi while saving her, but an ATF agent Doug Carlin who, along with the Claire who has 
survived the terrorist’s murderous assaults twice, belongs to the altered reality of the past world. 
The one who saves Claire and dies in the penultimate scene and the one who asks Claire “Have 
we met?” and drives away with her at the end of the film are both Doug Carlin. At the same time, 
they are not exactly the same person either. Similarly, what Oblivion presents as a happy ending is 
problematic. Whereas in Déjà Vu it is time travel and branched time that simultaneously produce 
and problematize a narrative resolution, human cloning creates an analogous effect in Oblivion. In 
comparison to these two films, Source Code is not only more ambivalent but much more radically 
disjunctive; that is, it highlights the non-identity of the protagonist far more explicitly. Warren 
Buckland, for instance, discusses this aspect of Source Code in relation to the idea of multiple 
disguises:
Colter is not only disguised as schoolteacher Sean Fentress, his avatar. While 
in this disguise, he takes on other disguises: on one serialized repetition, he 
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pretends to be a transport security officer in order to try to persuade everyone 
to switch off their phones and, when phoning his father, he pretends to be a 
friend of Colter. Although these changes are minor, Colter has at least some 
scope to customize his avatar.13
Although what Buckland points out above is not necessarily wrong, his comment makes it more 
difficult to understand—rather than further clarify—what is really at stake in the figuration of the 
main character. In the two examples mentioned by the passage, Colter Stevens does not go through 
any kind of physical transformation. He appears as Sean Fentress to the train’s passengers but not 
to us, the film’s audiences; instead, we consistently see Colter Stevens played by the actor Jake 
Gyllenhaal. When he announces himself as a security officer to search for a suspicious electronic 
device, nobody on the train believes what he says because he does not change either physically 
or in terms of his outfit. To them, he consistently remains the school teacher Sean Fentress. When 
Colter finally has a chance to call his father, he talks to the father simply by pretending to be 
somebody else who was supposed to be with him at the time of his death. Again, we see the same 
Jake Gyllenhaal making a phone call in this scene. All these minor details only reconfirm the 
rigidity of Colter/Sean identity rather than demonstrate the flexibility of self/avatar relationship. 
But it is precisely this rigidity that creates narrative conundrums. 
Before Source Code, the director Duncan Jones made another film Moon (2009). It is 
worth comparing these two films because they are both similarly concerned with the question of 
non-identity and yet differ from each other in some crucial points. The central thematic motif of 
Moon is the clone or what W. J. T. Mitchell calls “chronophobia,” which encompasses “a host of 
anxieties, from the specter of the uncanny double and the evil twin to the more generalized fear of 
the loss of individual identity.”14 “The fear of difference, of the stranger, the monster, the alien is 
what might be called a “rational” fear, or at the very least, a fear that has a determinate object or 
image....But the true terror arises when the different arrives masquerading as the same, threatening 
all differentiation and identification. The logic of identity itself is put in question by the clone.”15 
Human cloning films (e.g., The 6 th Day [Roger Spottiswoode, 2000], The Island [Michael Bay, 
2005]),16 where a confrontation between the original person and his or her clone occurs, can 
be seen as a technologically updated version of films dealing with doubles and doppelgängers. 
Human cloning remains an important motif in Moon, too, yet it is neither the relationship between 
original and copy nor the digital multitude that is featured as a central narrative focus. As a critical 
response to chronophobia, Moon shows how unethical it is to use clone technology for the purpose 
of maximizing capital accumulation. Clone or not, each person has its own “unique” identity and 
individual rights. The presumed lack of uniqueness and individual identity does not make human 
clones any more disposable as labor power than their original human model. 
Source Code is quite different from Moon because it seriously problematizes the ideas of 
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individual and identity. How Source Code puts these ideas into question can be elucidated by 
examining its ending closely. Many different interpretations of the ending of Source Code have 
been presented by various critics. Here is for instance how Warren Buckland describes the ending 
of the film:
The film ends by going back to the beginning of the day, with a series of 
unusual events: Colter is still attached to the source code technology; Colleen 
reads Colter’s text message; and Rutledge watches a new report of the bomber 
being arrested in Chicago, saying that his source code technology will one day 
have its moment. Equilibrium is reestablished in this final scene, and a major 
series of narrative transformations have taken place involving the creation of 
parallel universes....17
In contrast, according to Catherine Zimmer, rather than hinting the existence of parallel universes 
or alternate worlds, Source Code constructs a temporal loop; that is, “we are now endlessly trapped 
within the disjuncture of the source code that is Stevens’s last eight minutes of life—an eight 
minutes in which he has saved the girl and stopped the terrorist attack, and thus prevented himself 
from ever being sent back to find the bomber.”18 The validity of this assessment largely depends 
on what the pronoun “we” in her description exactly refers to. According to Sean Cubitt, the 
film’s ending is utopian in appearance only: “Source Code is a fiction masquerading as a utopia. 
As pseudo-utopia, it tells us of a future that already exists, a program awaiting execution.”19 
Furthermore, Cubitt is critical of the film’s individualism, that is, “its conviction that individuals 
are the only moral agents,” and “that individual actions matter to the extent that the whole world 
can be rewritten on the basis of one person’s acts and that this can be morally justifiable.”20 Cubitt 
is absolutely right about the fundamental limitation of Source Code and other similar films where 
one or a very small group of individuals can radically change the course of events or even the fate 
of human civilization on one’s own will and action. At the same time, it is not completely clear if 
the film’s ending simply celebrates a triumph of individualism. 
In the film’s last scene, Colter and Christina happily walk around a park in downtown 
Chicago. They stop in front of Anish Kapoor’s sculpture Cloud Gate, on the curved surface of 
which their images are reflected. Although the man facing the sculpture is Colter Stevens, the 
reflected image is not him but schoolteacher Sean Fentress. There is nothing particularly surprising 
about these split images because they seem consistent with the basic premises of the narrative: 
i.e., Source Code allows Colter’s mind to merge into Sean’s body and let Colter experience the 
eight minutes period immediately preceding the bomb explosion which killed Sean, Christina, and 
other train passengers. Nonetheless, there is something unnerving about the film’s ending. Colter 
finally succeeds in his mission of preventing the first terrorist attack on the commuter train, so that 
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Christina, along with everybody else on the train, does not have to die. But this means that Sean 
Fentress also does not die. If Sean is alive, then, where is he? The person standing right next to 
Christina in front of Cloud Gate is not Sean Fentress. He has the appearance of Sean but inside 
is Colter Stevens. What makes it possible for Colter’s mind to take over Sean’s body is, first, the 
invention of the Source Code apparatus, and second, Sean’s death. Sean must be dead because 
that is the absolutely necessary condition for Colter to be in the alternate world in the first place. 
Without Sean as his avatar, he would not be on the doomed train, looking for clues to identify the 
bomber and the target of the more devastating second bomb attack. Of course, Dr. Rutledge and his 
staff can choose another passenger as Colter’s avatar, but in that case, the narrative development 
would be radically different from the version presented in the film. Does this mean that there is an 
apparent contradiction or impossibility in this last scene? The answer is yes if we only focus on 
the logical consistency of this alternate world as a closed system. However, when examined from 
a wider perspective, the happy ending of the film shows that history is inerasable. Even though 
alternate narrative developments are repeatedly shown, there is one fact that remains unchanged: it 
is only through the action of Colter Stevens that those alternate chains of events are produced. What 
makes this possible is of course Source Code, which connects the functioning part of half-dead 
Colter Stevens’s brain to the afterglow of now-dead Sean Fentress’s consciousness. No matter how 
or how many times the story is rewritten, the kernel of truth never changes: Sean Fentress died of a 
terrorist bombing, and Captain Colter Stevens was fatally injured during his mission in Afghanistan 
and declared dead officially. Stevens is omnipotent and at the same time completely powerless. 
Infinite variations and possibilities can be generated by the technology of Source Code and Colter’s 
“action,” and yet nothing in the end changes. Colter and Christina may enjoy their stroll together 
in the park; however, as far as she and everybody else is concerned, the man walking with her is 
without a shadow of doubt “Sean Fentress,” not Colter Stevens, whose head and upper torso remain 
preserved inside a capsule at a US military base. Undoing of terrorist violence through Source 
Code requires the death of Sean Fentress as a victim of that terrorist violence in the first place. This 
conundrum seems to be solved when Colter Stevens successfully demonstrates that history can be 
rewritten; that is, in the final version of alternate history, “Sean” is alive because there is no bomb 
explosion. But this also means that there is no need to activate Source Code to capture a terrorist 
bomber who fails to carry out his plan. Precisely because Colter Stevens so successfully averts 
the terrorist bombing, “Sean Fentress” and Christina safely arrive in Chicago and stroll together 
in the park. Meanwhile, a Colter Stevens of this alternate world remains to be deployed as part of 
the Source Code program when a terror attack happens in the near future. Thus, the film’s ending, 
where Stevens is finally liberated yet at the same time permanently entrapped, signifies that history 
can be rewritten only to the extent that it remains unchanged. 
Therefore, it is necessary to rethink Cubitt’s criticism of Source Code as a utopian film whose 
potential is marred by a Hollywood cliché, i.e., a convenient assertion of banal individualism. 
Mitsuhiro Yoshimoto
132
It is debatable, for instance, whether the protagonist of Source Code, whose mind and body are 
permanently split, can still be called an individual. Some critics even claim that he is not human. 
“The so-called subject under surveillance,” writes Stewart, “is wholly objectified. By constrast, 
the subject reduced in its own right to surveillance conduit (…the…hero of Source Code as 
computerized scanner rather than inhabited body) is an online info bank.” 21 Allan Cameron 
and Richard Misek “suggest that the film…evokes the digital processes associated with image 
playback....Each time Stevens relives the memory of the train’s eight minutes, he moves along 
an eight-minute video track that plays within his head. Indeed, Stevens himself could perhaps be 
regarded as a metaphoric play-head, moving forward and backward along the passageways of the 
train’s compartments, trapped within a sequence that he is himself generating.” 22 These are both 
intriguing ideas, yet we still need to deal with the fact that inhabited or not, Colter Stevens appears 
as a character with human body rather than as a non-anthropocentric image. 
If the audiences enjoy watching Source Code and get pleasure out of their viewing 
experience, why they do so cannot be explained “by the classical theories of identification, or even 
of alignment and engagement.”23 In other words, the conventional model of spectatorship is not of 
much help here. Subjectivity in Source Code is produced by a permanently dispersed and endlessly 
proliferating process of reproduction. Colter Stevens exists everywhere and at the same time 
nowhere. Not a clone but a digitally serialized character without the origin, he is a counterpart to 
the digital multitude.24 He overcomes an initial sense of total disorientation and gradually adjusts 
himself to his surrounding worlds (i.e., a commuter train and a simulated cockpit) by accepting a 
deictic mode of cinematic experience, which is characterized by, according to Pepita Hesselberth, 
“the relationality between cinematic environments and the participating viewer in terms of the 
specific experience of being here, now, and me that it affords.” 25 What matters is not who he 
really is but the fact that he as an embodied person exists here and now. The sense of reality is not 
produced by the objective status of the world but by the dynamic relationship between the world 
and the observer who is situated inside the world being observed. The spatio-temporal context is 
an essential component of this cinematic experience, the subject of which is not a structural effect 
but an embodied viewer “I” existing “here” and “now.” It is precisely through this deictic mode 
of cinematic experience that enables Colter Stevens to regain his sense of self and also allows the 
viewers of Source Code to see him as the film’s “hero” in a conventional sense. At the same time, 
precisely because they are highly context dependent, deictics are open-ended indexical markers 
which do not have fixed meanings or objects of reference. The environment at any given moment 
may make sense to Stevens through deixis; however, this does not mean that what he experiences 
over a certain duration of time guarantees the consistency of “here,” “now,” and “me” or the 
identity of the subject of experience, i.e., that of Stevens himself. 
Towards the end of Source Code, Captain Goodwin receives a text message from Colter 
Stevens. There is nothing particularly noteworthy or unexpected about this incident because the 
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film finally reveals that Goodwin—despite “flashback” images of Steven’s failed missions—has 
been all along communicating with him through text messages. The short “movies” of his search 
for the terror suspect are repeatedly shown only to the film’s viewers; that is, Goodwin has no 
access to the audio-visual images or simulacra of alternate worlds. Yet Stevens’s last text message 
is startling because of its destination, i.e., Goodwin’s cell phone. Neither Stevens as an embodied 
character nor the environment in which he conducts an investigation is real, so that any message 
he sends should appear only on a video monitor attached to the Source Code apparatus inside 
the military base. Perhaps the appearance of his text message on Goodwin’s cell phone indicates 
that Stevens’s mind no longer exists within the closed circuit of Source Code but has become 
ubiquitous on networks. Consequently, the role of the screen changes in the course of the narrative: 
initially functioning to separate the spaces of reality and simulation, the screen in the end becomes 
an interface through which they become indistinguishable without necessarily merging into one.26 
The ending of Source Code is absolutely ambivalent. On one hand, it presents a utopian 
hope that contrary to the central tenet of neoliberal rationality (i.e., “there is no alternative”), it is 
still possible to imagine alternatives or “another world.”27 Despite the complexity of the narrative 
settings and development, it is not at all difficult to accept the final development of Source Code as 
an optimistic reaffirmation of the power of an individual to change the reality and challenge what 
appears to be a predestined course of history. On the other hand, as examined closely above, the 
film’s hero Colter Stevens is hardly a conventionally individuated character. He is simultaneously 
omnipotent and completely powerless, present ubiquitously as simulacra and yet existing nowhere. 
He is in the end nothing more than part of a networked system of hegemony, and as such renders 
the idea of responsibility meaningless. Jean Baudrillard argues that: 
Hegemony works through general masquerade, it relies on the excessive use 
of every sign and obscenity, the way it mocks its own values, and challenges 
the rest of the world by its cynicism (“carnivalization”). Classical, historical 
domination imposed a system of positive values, displaying as well as 
defending these values. Contemporary hegemony, on the other hand, relies 
on a symbolic liquidation of every possible value. The terms “simulacrum,” 
“simulation” and “virtual” summarize this liquidation, in which every 
signification is eliminated in its own sign, and the profusion of signs parodies 
a by now unobtainable reality.28
Colter Stevens is a hero only to the extent that the idea of hero is emptied out as its own parody. 
Even if it is possible to imagine another world and create necessary changes to actualize that 
world, without a genuine agent of individual actions who can take responsibility for those actions, 
any changes would be easily appropriated as a means of reproducing the original status quo in 
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the form of an infinite loop. Source Code deserves a close critical scrutiny not because it offers 
a utopian alternative to neoliberalism but because it helps us cognitively map the neoliberal 
present.29 
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